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THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
t
Rachelle C. Sampson

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the frequency of firms participating in inter-firm
collaborations has increased dramatically. Estimates of the increase in domestic and international firm collaborations over the
last twenty years vary in magnitude, but not in sign.' Additionally,
alliances appear to be an increasingly important strategy tool, according to recent estimates of firm revenues from such collaborative activity. 2

These trends likely reflect the perceived benefits

from collaboration. Firms may transfer technologies, achieve
economies of scale in manufacturing, marketing or R&D, and access capabilities that may be difficult to develop in-house.3 Firms
may even ally with competitors to set standards in an industry or to
meet difficult time goals for development of new technologies. 4
t New York University, Stem School of Business, 40 West 4th Street, Tisch 7-10, New
York, NY 10012, Ph. (212) 998-0875; Fax: (212) 995-4221; E-mail rsampson@stem.nyu.edu.
I See KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
U.S.-FOREIGN BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS (1985) (providing analysis of the characteristics and
history of international partnership agreements); Michael Hergert, & Deigon Morris, Trends in
International Collaborative Arrangements, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 99 (Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange ed., 1988) (analyzing the growth and purpose of collaborative agreements between international partners); Ellen R. Auster, International
CorporateLinkages: Dynamic Forms in Changing Environments, COLUMBIA J. WORLD Bus.,
Summer 1987, at 3 (providing an overview to the increase in international corporate linkages);
David C. Mowery et al., Strategic Alliances and Interfirm Knowledge Transfer, STRATEGIC
MGMT J., 77 (Dec. 1996) (examining the effect international collaborative agreements have on
the transfer of interfirm knowledge).
2 For example, Harbison and Pekar, Jr. find that revenues from alliances have more than
doubled during the 1990s, increasing to twenty one percent by 1997, for the top one thousand
US firms. Such revenues were expected to increase further to thirty five percent of total by the
end of 2002. J. R. HARBISON & P. PEKAR, JR., SMART ALLIANCES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
REPEATABLE SUCCESS 1 (1998).
3 Other cited benefits include: risk management, internalization of research spillovers,
and access to a wider know-how network. Mary Tripsas et al., Discouraging Opportunistic
Behavior in Collaborative R & D: A New Role for Government, 24 RES. POL'Y 367, 369 (1995).
4 An illustration of firms allying to meet difficult time targets includes the recent alliance
between Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler (along with several suppliers, universities,
and branches of the U.S. Federal Government) for the development of a more fuel-efficient
vehicle. The "Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles" (PNGV) was formed to meet a
government mandate to produce an automobile capable of eighty miles per gallon by 2004.
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These types of benefits often extend beyond the life of the alliances, as firms learn skills and gain competencies from their partners.5
Realizing such benefits, however, is far from assured. Firms
entering alliances face considerable moral hazard problems since
partner behavior is often unobservable and the costs of opportunism are potentially high. Allying firms cannot be sure that their
partners are contributing equitably to their alliance activities.
Partners may, for example, contribute fewer or lesser quality inputs to the alliance than originally agreed. Allying firms also risk
unintended transfer of valuable technologies or knowledge to their
partners, given imperfect intellectual property rights protection.
Firms are naturally concerned about creating a (stronger) competitor if too much valuable knowledge is transferred to partners. Differing managerial styles as well as competing interests and expectations may further compound the difficulties of coordinating
across organizational boundaries. These challenges, if inadequately dealt with, can thwart attempts to create the cooperative
environment necessary to achieve collaborative benefits.
Fortunately, there exists a means to deal with these coordination difficulties - alliance structure. Formal structure provides a
means for firms to set out partner rights and obligations, articulate
alliance goals and expectations, align incentives, and provide a
framework for decision making and adapting to unforeseen contingencies. In this sense, structure can reduce some of the uncertainty in collaboration and give the partners some confidence that
the spirit of the agreement will be upheld, ultimately improving
chances for alliance success.
This Paper considers the role of structure in strategic alliances. Despite a burgeoning literature on alliances, 6 several fundamental questions remain unanswered. For example, what is alliance structure and how is it chosen? How do prior business relationships between firms affect this choice of structure? Does the
United States Council for Automotive Research, PNGV Faces Challenge to Invent 'Super Car,'
at http://www.uscar.org/pngv/challenge.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
5 See Mowery et al., supra note 1, at 77; David C. Mowery, Collaborative Ventures
Between U.S. and Foreign Manufacturing Firms: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE VENTURES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 1-22 (David C. Mowery ed., 1988). These alli-

ances are also a primary vehicle for financing R&D by nascent firms. For example, Lemer and
Tsai find that R&D spending in biotechnology alliances alone was almost equal to venture capital disbursements across all industries ($3.5 billion versus $3.7 billion). JOSH LERNER & ALEXANDER TSAI, DO EQUITY FINANCING CYCLES MATrER? EVIDENCE FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY

ALLIANCES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7464, 2000).
6 See Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 781
(1998) (providing a review of this literature).
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choice of structure matter for performance? Here, I examine alliance structure in detail, examining how such structure is chosen,
with guidance from the organizational economics literature, and
the implications of such choice for the ultimate outcome of the
alliance. Several recent empirical studies on alliance structure
have improved our understanding of structure in alliances, highlighting key structural alternatives and properties, as well as how
structure is chosen. While this discussion is informative, we are
still left with the question - does alliance structure really matter
when it comes to performance? Thus, I consider whether this
choice has real implications for alliance outcomes with evidence
from R&D alliances. By discussing and synthesizing several recent findings, a clearer picture of the role and importance of alliance structure emerges.
I.

THE COOPERATION PROBLEM IN ALLIANCES

Notwithstanding the potential benefits from alliances,
substantial barriers to successful collaboration exist. Firms face
considerable moral hazard problems since partner behavior is often
unobservable and the costs of opportunism are potentially high.
Allying firms cannot be sure that their partners are contributing
equitably to alliance activities. Partner firms may, for example,
contribute fewer or lesser quality inputs to alliance activities than
originally agreed. This is particularly so where firms undertake
complex activities, such as high technology manufacturing, or activities with uncertain outcomes, such as joint R&D. In such
cases, firms cannot easily infer partner contributions by examining
results since the link between effort and results is highly variable.
Given shared outcomes, the link between what a firm contributes
and its payoffs is diluted and, consequently, the firm's incentive to
contribute valuable resources is dampened. Thus, for example,
firms collaborating in R&D may not assign personnel knowledgeable about the relevant technologies or may provide less experienced research scientists to reduce their direct cost. In this way,
firms may attempt to free ride off the efforts of their partners.
Similarly, firms are naturally concerned about making partners into (more) formidable competitors. A firm's most valuable
assets are those that distinguish the firm from its competitors.
These assets are typically embodied in a firm's intellectual property, whether in the form of new technology or product specifications, manufacturing process techniques, or information on key
markets and the competitive strategy of the firm. By simply colocating key personnel or allowing site visits by a partner, a firm
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may inadvertently transfer some of these key assets. Firms may
also deliberately take partner assets; partners may seek to learn as
much as possible from their partners while simultaneously reducing access of other partner firms to their own technologies and assets.7 Given the imperfect nature of intellectual property rights
protection, a firm cannot rely on the courts to keep others from
appropriating rents from its intellectual property. 8 Where these
risks are severe, firms may limit contributions of resources to alliance activities to protect against such opportunism. While these
steps may not be inconsistent with the alliance agreement in a
strict sense, such actions taken to guard against opportunism may
lower the ultimate performance of the alliance.
In addition to addressing concerns of opportunistic behavior
by partners, firms must also find ways to effectively communicate
and coordinate activities. Differences in organizational and national cultures and/or managerial styles may lead to implementation issues not unlike those faced in mergers. Firms not only have
to make decisions and coordinate actions within their own organizational boundaries, but must also negotiate and agree on how to
implement often complex tasks across organizations. Bureaucracy
and political processes often slow decision-making within firms;
these difficulties are compounded in decision-making between
firms since partners often have very different ways of approaching
tasks. These differences, along with competing interests and the
fact that partners often place different values on the alliance activities, mean that each may have different levels of commitment to
the alliance. Misunderstandings and costly missteps may arise as a
consequence.
Via appropriately selected and crafted alliance structure, however, firms can alleviate concerns over opportunism, clearly set out
expectations, and improve communication over the course of the
alliance. By appropriate alignment of incentives and formal constraints on behavior (such as explicitly stating required contributions), firms can reduce concerns over free riding and leakage of
intellectual property. Thoughtful planning through structure, even
7 Hamel et al., Collaborate with Your Competitors - and Win, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.Feb. 1989, at 133-39 (finding that firms in cross-border alliances often pursue this strategy,
seeking to learn as much from their partner while minimizing access to their own assets).
8 Formal protections for intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, do not perfectly protect a firm's intellectual assets. See WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL.,
PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL

ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S.

MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7552, 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7552 (detailing a recent study on
firms' use of patents to protect their knowledge based assets and a review of literature in this
area).
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if not all aspects are legally enforceable, may reduce the potential
for misunderstandings and uncoordinated responses to unanticipated contingencies that arise over the course of the alliance.
II.
A.

ALLIANCE STRUCTURES AND CHOICE

Exploring Alliance Structure: A Discussion of Contractsand
Equity Joint Ventures

Firms have a myriad of forms to choose from in organizing
their alliance activities, ranging from simple licensing arrangements to more complex forms, such as the equity joint venture,
where firms incorporate a separate entity for their collaborative
efforts. 9 These forms can be loosely grouped into two categories:
purely contractual and institutional (i.e., the equity joint venture).
While all alliances involve some form of written contract, purely
contractual forms do not involve a separate legal entity for alliance
activities (c.f., the equity joint venture). In institutional forms, or
equity joint ventures, firms create a new entity that is jointly
owned and operated by two or more allying firms.'0 While there is
substantial heterogeneity within each of these forms - for example,
in terms of how firms align incentives and provide for dispute
resolution - discrete differences between the forms exist. These
distinctions ultimately determine how firms choose between the
two forms for their alliance activities.
Conceptually, both contractual forms and equity joint ventures
lie on the organizational continuum between market and hierarchy,
and as "hybrids" they embody governance characteristics that lie
somewhere between these two extremes." The differences between the two structures are best highlighted in terms of features
unique to the equity joint venture. Relative to the purely contractual form, the equity joint venture more closely resembles hierar-

9 For a more thorough discussion of the different forms alliance organization may take,
see Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange, Why Should Firms Cooperate? The Strategy and Economic Basis for Cooperative Ventures, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUsINESS 3-28 (1988); WALTER W. POWELL, RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 295-336

(Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., vol. 12 1990).
10 Gary P. Pisano et al., Joint Ventures and Collaborative Arrangements in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry, in INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE VENTURES IN U.S.

MANUFACTURING 23, 32 (David C. Mowery ed., 1988); Joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 387, 390 (1997).
11 Oxley, supra note 10, at 389-92. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative
Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
269-96 (1991).
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chy and has some unique attributes that influence how firms adapt
to unforeseen contingencies.12
All equity joint ventures have a joint board of directors, which
is composed of members from all partner firms. 1 3 Via this joint
board of directors, firms can better communicate as well as veto
strategic decisions regarding alliance activities. 14 In addition to
this joint governance at the strategic level, joint ventures are characterized by operational management that, at least on a day-to-day
basis, is independent of the partner firms. Such independent management allows "self determination" by the joint venture, relative
to purely contractual alliance structure, such that the resources
contributed to the venture effectively become exclusive resources
of the alliance and are managed to ensure optimal effort from those
resources. Independent management is a common feature in joint
venture contracts. For example, in the joint venture agreement
between Parlex Corporation and Shanghai Radio Factory, formed
to develop, manufacture, and market flexible printed circuits, the
partners stipulate that a general manager is to be appointed to and
compensated by the joint venture and, perhaps more importantly,
that the general manager is responsible for the day-to-day management of the alliance.15
Joint ventures also function as repositories for resources contributed by partner firms. The joint venture, as a separate legal
entity, allows firms to effectively contribute resources to a third
firm, which then manages these resources somewhat independently
12 Several alliance agreement examples are used in this discussion. All examples were
taken from alliance contracts filed with the SEC under the requirement to file "material contracts."
13 J. PETER KILLING, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS (1983).
14 Id. For example, the following provision is made in a joint venture agreement between
SICPA Industries and Flex Products:
2.2 DESIGNATION OF PROJECTS. Specific tasks to be undertaken by
SICPA Industries and Flex shall be determined by the unanimous vote of

the committee. Neither SICPA Industries ... nor Flex ... shall have any

obligation to perform tasks or projects except as authorized and directed
by a unanimous vote of the Committee.
In this case, the "Committee" is the joint venture governing body consisting of equal numbers of
members from Flex Products and SICPA Industries. Both firms have the explicit right of veto
Joint Venture Agreement, available at
over any activities of the joint venture.
http://cori.missouri.edu.
15 Clause 12.3 provides: "The functions and responsibilities of the General Manager shall
be... to organize and lead the daily management and operation of the Joint Venture Company
and to establish the sales strategy and pricing of products sold by the Joint Venture Company..
• ." This responsibility is extended beyond day to day responsibilities to major problem solving
and execution of contracts on behalf of the joint venture: "The major issues of the Joint Venture
Company shall be decided through consultations among the General Manager and Deputy General Manager ....

The General Manager ...

shall have the authority to execute contracts and

other instruments on behalf of the Joint Venture Company." Joint Venture Agreement, available at http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data724988/0000910647-95-000076.txt.
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of the parent firms. While most alliance agreements specify the
contributions required of each partner firm in some detail, only
contributions to alliances structured as joint ventures may become
the legal property of the alliance itself until dissolution. The most
common form of these contributions is cash. For example, in the
joint venture between eNote.com Inc. and Seafont Pty. Ltd. to develop and launch a TV email service in Australia and New Zealand, cash contributions to the joint venture may only be used for
the purposes of the alliance.' 6 Technology licenses are another
common contribution to the joint venture's asset stocks. In the
joint venture between Semiconductor Laser International Corporation and Orthogenesis Systems, Inc., formed for the purposes of
development, production, and sale of medical laser system products, each partner grants an exclusive license over relevant technologies to the joint venture. 1 7 Contributions may also be in kind.
For example, in the joint venture between MEMC Electronics and
Khazanah Nasional Berhad for the joint production of silicon wafers, MEMC is required to contribute specific technical assistance
to the joint venture, including a "reproducible set of full-size engineering drawings." 18 Interestingly, these contributions sometimes
extend beyond physical or capital based assets to employees. For
example, in the joint venture agreement between Read Rite Corporation and Sumitomo Metal Industries to develop, manufacture,
and market thin-film heads for disk drive manufacturers, employees contributing to the joint venture become employees of the joint
venture, rather than the parent company.19 Further, recall of such

16 Clause 4.1 provides: "Capital Contributions. On the closing date, each Party shall contribute Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) in immediately available funds to the
account of [the joint venture] .... The contributed capital shall be used only for the payment of
approved expenditures contained in the [joint venture] Business Plan." Joint Venture Agreement, available at http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/58636/0000912057-00-020383index.html.
17 Clause 5(a) provides: "SLI hereby grants to the Joint Venture an exclusive license of
the Patent Rights and Know-How of SLI insofar as they relate to the manufacture of the Orthogenesis System to make, use and sell the Systems worldwide in the field of medical laser system
products for the uses described on Schedule I. The term of such license shall be coterminous
with the Term of the Joint Venture." A similar provision exists granting exclusive rights of
relevant Orthogenesis patents and know-how to the venture. Joint Venture Agreement, available at www.sec.gov/sarchives/edgar/data/921445/0000921445-99-000028-index.html.
18 Clause 2.2 provides: "[MEMC Electronic's] technical assistance ... shall include the
delivery to the [joint venture] of a technical design package written in English in terms of standard engineering practices and shall include I (One) reproducible set of full-sized engineering

drawings."

MEMC ELECTRONIC MATERIALS, INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT EXHIBIT 10-iii

(1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/945436/0000950124-97-001680.
txt.
19 Clause 10.2 provides: "Employees. The parties agree that after the incorporation of the
[joint venture], the day to day operation of the [joint venture].... shall be carried out mainly by
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employees back to the parent company is explicitly limited.2 °
Along these lines, each partner firm also has limited powers of fiat
over employees of the alliance in an equity joint venture. Even
where joint venture personnel are drawn from the parent firms,
these personnel often become employees of the venture rather than
of the parent firms. 2' Since all of the firms involved have a managerial presence in the venture via the joint board, each partner has
some control over the promotion or demotion of workers that are
over- or under-performing, as well as some influence over the allocation of workers to specific tasks.22 As Killing notes:
Communication between the venture and the parent company
is likely to be improved, simply because employees of the
two firms will know each other. More complete information
offers the prospect of more complete control. Secondly, such
an employee is likely to act in ways which his parent would
find acceptable, even when his actions are not overtly being
controlled.23
A final attribute of the joint venture worth noting is the ability
to implement a capital reinvestment or dividend policy. A capitalization or dividend policy may function as a punishment mechanism to deter non-cooperative behavior in the alliance such as the
under provision of quality and/or effort. Several examples of such
policies exist in the joint venture agreements; these policies usually take the form of not distributing venture profits during a financial period. For example, the joint venture agreement between
Diodes Incorporated and Shanghai Kai Hong Electronics Company
(for the manufacture and sale of diodes and associated electronic
components) states that the joint venture board may temporarily
suspend profit distributions in consideration of the joint venture's
long-term growth.2 4 While it is conceivable that allying firms
employees dispatched by [Sumitomo] who shall become employees of the Uoint venture] as
soon after their dispatch to the Uoint venture] as is practicable." On file with author.
20 Clause 10.2, continues: "[Sumitomo] will not recall a dispatched employee without the
consent of the President of the Uoint venture] and the employee involved." On file with author.
21 See, e.g., KILLING, supra note 13, at 24-29 (finding that in study of Mexican joint ventures, eight out of ten general managers were on the payroll of the joint venture, rather than the
parent. In only four out of ten ventures was the general manager's bonus tied to one parent's
results. Less senior employees are even less likely to be officially tied to a specific parent).
22 Of course, to the extent that employees rotate back to parent firms, incentives to act in
the best interests of the joint venture rather than the parent may be curtailed. Such incentives
may be further attenuated, if employees seek to gain employment with the other partner firm.
Joint venture agreement terms, however, often preclude a firm from hiring its partner's employees that are working for the venture.
23 KILLING, supra note 13, at 26-27.
24 "The Uoint venture] shall distribute its profit once every year.... In consideration of
the [joint venture's] long term growth, the Board of Directors may pass a resolution to tempo-
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could specify such a policy in a purely contractual alliance, the
ability of each firm to enforce a penalty is more limited. The fact
that the joint venture can legally own assets and determine the distribution of alliance profits back to the alliance partners (in a way
that is externally enforceable) gives the joint venture an advantage
over purely contractual alliance structure in credibly implementing
such a policy.
These characteristics suggest that the equity joint ventures
permit firms to adapt to unforeseen contingencies that arise over
the course of the alliance in a more coordinated fashion, relative to
more contractual alliance structures. Such enhanced coordination
and control, however, comes at a cost. The costs of administrative
mechanisms in the equity joint venture (such as the board of directors) as well as the set up and negotiation expenses far exceed
those of more contractual structures on average. 25 Further, the
mechanisms that facilitate greater coordination and control in an
alliance also introduce bureaucratic costs. For example, while
joint decision-making provided by the joint board of directors may
allow greater coordination between alliance partners, this coordination adds inefficiencies to the decision-making process. Given
these costs, firms should use equity joint ventures only where alliance activities require more substantial coordination and control.
As discussed below, this is more likely the case when firms cannot
adequately specify, monitor, and enforce partner rights and obligations via contract.2 6
While it is useful to examine what makes joint ventures
unique from purely contractual forms of organization, focusing on
these distinctions masks the many and varied mechanisms that
firms may use to create cooperative environments in all types of
alliances, whether contractual or institutional (equity joint ven-

rarily suspend the profit distribution." Joint Venture Agreement Between Mrs. J.H. Xing and
27 (Mar. 18, 1996) (on file with SEC, filed Ex. 10.17 with Annual ReDiodes Incorporated cl.
port, Form 10-K for fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 1995 (Apr. 1, 1996)), available at
http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/29002/0000950150-96-000215.txt).
25 Pisano et al., supra note 10, at 32.
26 Consistent with the additional costs associated with the equity joint venture as well as
the recognition that not all alliances warrant establishment of an ongoing concern, equity joint
ventures appear slightly less common than purely contractual forms of alliance governance. For
example, in 1996, the Securities Data Corporation Database on Alliances and Joint Ventures
reported that 919 alliances were announced by firms in the telecommunications equipment and
microelectronics industries. Of these 919 alliances, 378 (or 41%) were structured as equity joint
ventures. Manufacturing was the most common activity for the joint ventures established
(44%), perhaps because joint ventures can carry assets over multiple time periods independent
of the partner firms.
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tures). Researchers in the property rights literature 27 focus on the
allocation of control rights, or the residual ownership rights conferred by a contract. Via control rights over key assets or outcomes of the alliance, firms have a tool to induce efficient investments by firms, even where these investments are not perfectly
observable.
In addition to allocating control rights, firms can also provide
greater detail on the rights and obligations of the partners in the
alliance agreement. With greater detail on the rights and obligations of the partners, firms provide documentation that may be
used as a reference to reduce misunderstandings. For example,
firms may detail the contributions required by the firms in terms of
28
specific technologies, spell out the phases of the alliance activity,
and even specify managers for the joint development.29 Increased
detail in an alliance agreement may provide greater guidance to the
courts and, consequently, more efficient outcomes should external
enforcement be required. The presumption is that the threat of legal enforcement will curtail opportunistic behavior since courts
can more easily direct specific performance or appropriate damages when the terms of the collaboration are set out in greater detail. 30 However, there are reasons to believe that the detail in an
alliance agreement serves to do more than simply provide guidance
to the courts in an event of a legal dispute. Firms frequently inSee e.g., S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Vertical Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691(1986); J. Lerner & R.P.
Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology
Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125 (1988).
27

28 See, e.g., RAMTRON INT'L CORP., QUARTERLY REPORT PERSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR
15D OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, file no. 0-17739 (May 15, 1997), available at

http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/849502/0000849502-97-000016.txt (providing multiple
examples of these specific contributions and process steps in the joint development agreement
between Ramtron and ULVAC, an alliance formed for the development of thin process films
used in FRAM (computer memory)). Two example illustrations are set out below.
Clause 2.2: "Phase 2: The SPZ-1000 machine will be transferred to Ramtron, Colorado
Springs at the beginning of Phase 2. The work undertaken will include composition, microstructural, electrical and other optimizations. Specific Phase 2 objectives will be defined by the parties through mutual consultations. A minimum of 50 wafers per month will be supplied by Ramtron for the development. Machine time for joint development work will be shared with customer evaluations, at ULVAC's cost and Ramtron prototype production. ULVAC will provide
in-house support during Phase 2 to the extent agreed by the parties .... "
Clause 4.1: "Necessary number of stack and/or individual layer films will be patterned
photolithographically at Ramtron for etch development work at ULVAC."
29 See id. The contract between Ramtron and ULVAC, provides in Clause 2 that, "The
parties hereby agree that the Project Leader for Ramtron shall be Mr. Tom Davenport and the
Project Leader for ULVAC shall be Mr. Yoshifumi Ota." Id.
10See Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in
Long Term Contracts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 69, 71 (1991) ("[Tjhe presumption is clear that courts
will either direct specific performance or apply appropriately measured damages to assure that
the intentions of the parties fulfilled.").
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clude terms that are not legally enforceable (at least in terms of
directing specific performance), such as the specification of particular individuals for management roles in the alliance. Further,
firms frequently waive their rights to court adjudication in their
alliance agreements. 31 Given this explicit removal of court adjudication as a motive for more detailed contracts, this suggests that
more detailed contracts provide guidance to the firms (rather than
the courts) and may be an important tool for planning collaborative
activities. Thus, the role of alliance structure likely goes beyond
being a legal tool to protect partner assets and provide guidance to
the courts, to being a means to plan collaborative activities and
agree in advance on the key parameters of cooperation.
B.

Choice of Alliance Structure

How firms choose among these varied alliance structures is
the subject of much work in the organizational economics literature. Researchers in organizational economics argue that the governance mechanisms we observe reflect a rational attempt to induce either efficient ex ante investments (i.e., property rights theory 32) or to reduce ex post bargaining and hold up threats (i.e.,
transaction cost economics33 ). Generally, these studies have focused on the choice of formal organization to control either ex ante
or ex post contracting costs. While some recent research has examined the allocation of control rights according to property rights

31 See, e.g., Ross Tech., Inc., Annual Report, Development Agreement, SEC Form 10-K
Exhibit 10.43 (1997), available at hhtp://www.sec.gov ("Each party waives any rights to bring
any such dispute, controversy or claim in any other forum or proceeding, including without
limitation, the International Trade Commission of the United States or any other administrative
or judicial forum.").
32 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). That is, property
rights theory ('PRT') as developed initially by Grossman and Hart. Under PRT, contracts are
necessarily incomplete - required investments are not fully contractible. Thus, organizational
form is determined by an allocation of ownership and, consequently, control rights that will
induce an efficient level of investment by parties to the contract. Id. at 695-97. See generally
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (providing a thorough
review of this literature).
33 Using a transaction cost economics approach, governance or contract structure is chosen on the basis of ex post quasi rents, which are driven by the combination of incomplete con-

tracts and relationship specific assets. Generally, the more specialized are relationship assets
(such that partners face sharply reduced values for those assets outside the relationship), the
larger the quasi rents and the higher the likelihood of integration. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS

(1975); Paul

L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988); Scott E. Masten, The Organizationof Production:Evidence from
the Aerospace Industry, 27 J.L. ECON. 403 (1984).
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logic in the context of alliances, 34 the bulk of the empirical work
on alliance structural choice has been in the transaction cost economics literature.
The transaction cost economics literature, with its focus on
discrete modes of organization, as suggested by Oliver Williamson, 35 largely examines the choice between equity joint ventures
and more contractual modes of organization, rather than the choice
of alliance terms per se.36 For example, Oxley examines the
choice of equity joint venture over more contractual modes of organization as a function of transaction characteristics. 37 Generally,
this literature suggests that firms are more likely to select an equity
joint venture when alliance activities are more complex and involve greater uncertainty. More uncertain or complex activities
make it difficult for firms to specify rights and obligations in a
contract and enforce compliance.
Several empirical studies support these transaction cost arguments. For example, Sampson finds that allying firms are more
likely to choose equity joint ventures when the size of the alliance
increases (in terms of the number of partners) and when joint activities are more complex, involving multiple tasks such as manufacturing and marketing in addition to joint R&D.38 This finding is
consistent with work by Pisano and Oxley, 39 where alliances involving more than one type of activity were found to be more
likely to use equity links than were alliances involving only one
activity. Oxley also finds that increasing the number of partners
may exacerbate monitoring difficulties and induce a choice of
more hierarchical governance.4 °
34 Work in the property rights literature focuses primarily on the allocation of equity and
control rights. For example, Lemer and Merges find that residual control rights in biotechnology alliances are allocated as a function of the financial resources and technology endowment of
a partner. See Lemer & Merges, supra note 27. Work by Robinson and Stuart yields similar
results. See David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic
Alliances (Feb. 17, 2002) (unpublished manuscript submitted to NBER Strategic Alliance Conference, available at http://www.nber.org/books/stragalli/robinson.pdf.
35 See Williamson, supra note 1I, at 269.
36 See Oxley supra note 10, at 387-409; Joanne E. Oxley, Institutional Environment and
the Mechanisms of Governance: The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure

of Inter-firm Alliances, 38 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 283, 283-309 (1999); Gary P. Pisano,
Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence fl-om Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L.

ECON. & ORG. 109, 109-26 (1989); Rachelle C. Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance
in R&D Alliances, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2003); Rachelle C. Sampson, Organizational Choice and R&D Alliances: Knowledge Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives,
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2003).

37 Oxley, supra note 10, at 390.
38 Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances,
supra note 36.
39 Pisano, supra note 36, at 122; Oxley, supra note 10, at 402.
40 Oxley, supra note 36, at 406.
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The prevailing institutional regime also affects the choice of
alliance structure. In international alliances, for example, stronger
intellectual property rights reduce the need for the equity joint
venture.4 1 Similarly, equity joint ventures are less likely chosen
when partners are headquartered in nations with strong rule of law
and efficient judicial systems. 42 These results suggest that the external institutional framework may improve the efficiency of
purely contractual alliance organizational forms, relative to equity
joint ventures. Firms may be able to better rely on external enforcement of intellectual property rights (for example) when allying across countries with strong property rights protections. Overall, the transaction cost analysis of alliance structural choice suggests that equity joint ventures are more likely chosen when alliance activities are difficult to contract for (in terms of specification, monitoring, and enforcement). When alliance activities are
difficult to contract for, costly haggling and renegotiation is more
likely during the course of the alliance. An equity joint venture
provides the incentives and the ability to adjust to unforeseen contingencies in a more coordinated fashion when compared to purely
contractual forms of alliance organization.
III. THE ROLE OF RELATIONSHIPS

IN CHOICE OF STRUCTURE

Formal alliance structure is, of course, not the only solution to
moral
hazard problem inherent in alliances. Discipline mechathe
nisms outside the contract itself can encourage cooperative behavior between partners. More specifically, repeated interactions can,
through implicit mechanisms, serve to mitigate moral hazard.43
Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that such repeated interactions can act as a discipline mechanism that supports
cooperative behavior among competitors. For example, Green and
Porter demonstrate that a cartel among competitors is sustainable
when firms repeatedly interact. 44 Similarly, Bernheim and Whinston show that, under certain market conditions, multimarket contact can sustain cooperation between competing firms.4 5 The
41 See id. at 395; see also Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances, supra note 36.
42 See Oxley, supra note 36, at 406; Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance in
R&D Alliances, supra note 36.
43 See Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games,
ECONOMETRICA 303, 318 (1993) (surveying the theoretical foundations).
" Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 93 (1984).
45 B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive
Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1, 2 (1990) (examining "the effect of multimarket contact on the
degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in the settings of repeated competition").
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foundations of these arguments are comparable to those made by
Robert Axelrod: a "tit for tat" strategy in a repeated game setting
can support long-term cooperation. Analogously, repeated contact
among allying firms can provide a discipline mechanism that supports cooperation. 46 In this sense, alliances are often not independent transactions - each alliance is embedded in a firm's network of past alliances and relationships with other firms.
Repeated interactions in the marketplace rather than with a
specific firm may lead to development of reputation, which may
also support economic exchange through less formal means.
Kreps argues that good reputations may prevent firms from behaving opportunistically if the firm believes that its good reputation
influences future trading opportunities: "[T]he reputation of a
trusted party can be a powerful tool for avoiding the transaction
costs of specifying and enforcing the terms of the transaction ....
The trusted party will honor that trust because to abuse it would
preclude or substantially limit opportunities to further engage in
future valuable transactions. '47 Naturally, firms must perceive the
value of these future business opportunities to exceed the value of
short-term non-cooperative behavior. Klein and Leffler lend empirical support to these arguments (through simulation), finding
that the threat of lost reputation is a means to enforce promises on
quality, which are otherwise unenforceable.4 8
Economists, of course, are not the only ones touting the impact of repeated interactions on cooperation. Macaulay argued
that firms rarely rely on legal sanctions to uphold terms of economic exchange and that reputation or social norms may serve to
ensure cooperative behavior. 49 Telser similarly argues that agreements can be self-enforcing, even if not complete, when the parties
value the future relationship sufficiently. 50 Granovetter states the
underlying arguments for the link between relationships and cooperative behavior: "[I]ndividuals with whom one has a continuing
relation have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not
to discourage future transactions; and ... departing from pure eco46

ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).

David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVE ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 116 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
48 Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forcesin Assuring Contractual
Performance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 633-37 (1981).
49 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63 (1963) (stating that the most obvious non-legal sanction is the "concern[]
with both the reaction of the other party and with his own business reputation").
50 L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 28-30 (1980) (analyzing the "Prisoner's Dilemma" in relation to economic transactions and arguing that contracts
are only self-enforcing so long as the parties cannot predict which transaction is the last one).
47
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nomic motives, continuing economic relations often become overstrong expectations of trust and
laid with social content that carries
5
abstention from opportunism.", 1
Empirical evidence provides some support for this link. Gulati
finds that partners choose equity based alliance organization
(including equity joint ventures) less frequently when the firms
have interacted previously. 52 Similarly, Gulati and Singh find that
firms with prior ties are less likely to choose more hierarchical
controls for their alliance activities and suggest that trust devel53
oped over these prior ties may alleviate concerns of opportunism.
These arguments are consistent with the more qualitative work of
Larson, who concludes that "It]he relative unimportance of formal
contractual aspects of exchange and, in contrast, the significance
norms appear to reflect the reality of
of trust and reciprocity
54
economic exchange.,
While the impact of relationships on the choice between discrete alliance structures has been examined, the effect of such relational governance on the degree of detail in alliance agreements
has only recently been explored. Given the costs of drafting more
detailed or complete contracts55 and setting up equity joint ventures, the impact of prior alliances on alliance structure appears
straightforward. Where alternative discipline mechanisms exist,
contracts are likely less detailed. However, recent evidence from
Ryall and Sampson suggests the opposite in the context of R&D
alliances in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries; prior relationships between firms lead to more detailed or
customized contracts.5 6 Consistent with prior work on contracting
in outsourcing relationships, 57 this finding suggests that prior rela5' Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481,490 (1985).
52 Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for
Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J.85, 102 (1995) ("[TJhe larger the number

of prior alliances between partners, the less likely their current alliance is to be equity based,
even when the presence of an R & D component is controlled for").
53 See Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. Sct. Q. 781-814
(1998).
5 Andrea Larson, Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Governance
of Exchange Relationships, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 76, 98 (1992).
55 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126-46

(1993).
56 M.D. RYALL & R.C. SAMPSON, Do PRIOR ALLIANCES INFLUENCE CONTRACT STRUC-

TURE? EVIDENCE FROM TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCE CONTRACTS (New York University Working

Paper, 2003).
57 See generally Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707 (2002) (dis-
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tionships allow parties to learn more about each other and draft
more detailed and, perhaps, better contracts. Thus, while choice of
alliance structure often reflects the proposed activities and coordination tasks presented by the alliance, such structure also may reflect the relationships between the allying parties.
IV

IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURAL CHOICE

The implicit assumption in most of the organizational economics literature is that choice of organizational structure consistent with theory (whether transaction cost economics or property
rights theory) leads to more efficient outcomes. According to
transaction cost logic, a discriminating alignment of transactions
with governance leads to more efficient outcomes via a reduction
of transaction costs. 58 While empirical evidence in this vein shows
strong support for the premise that firms choose alliance organization consistently with transaction cost predictions,5 9 there is less
evidence of the performance implications of governance selected
(or not selected) according to transaction cost predictions. Empirical support for the impact of structure on performance is necessary
to answer the question posed by Masten: "[A]re the phenomena
that constitute the object of our speculations important?" 60 Until
recently, we have lacked evidence on what firms gain from choosing the best versus the next best organizational alternative in the
context of alliances.
In a recent empirical study, Sampson shows that firms selecting alliance organization or structure according to transaction cost
arguments improves collaborative benefits substantially. 6 ' Why
might "misaligned" alliance structure (that is, choice inconsistent
with transaction cost logic) affect alliance performance? So what
if firms don't choose alliance organization according to theory? In
the context of R&D alliances, two scenarios are possible. First, if
firms do not structure alliances to adequately protect against opportunistic behavior by their partners and facilitate coordinated
responses to unforeseen contingencies, firms may take alternative
steps to minimize their exposure to potential non-cooperative becussing how formal contracts and relational governance complement each other rather than
work against each other).
58 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20-29 (1985).

59 See Oxley, supra note 10, at 396-407 (empirical analysis based on data from the Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indications data); Pisano, supra note 36, at 117-24 (analyzing 195 collaborative arrangements within the biotechnology industry); Sampson, Organizational Choice and R&D Alliances: Knowledge Based and TransactionCost Perspectives,supra
note 36.
60 Scott E. Masten, Modern Evidence on the Firm, AMER. ECON. REV., May 2002, at 428.
61 See Sampson, The Cost of MisalignedGovernance in R&D Alliances, supra note 36.
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havior. For example, firms may reduce the quality and extent of
resources contributed from what was originally intended. Alternatively, if firms choose an equity joint venture to facilitate coordinated responses and control non-cooperative behavior when alliance activities can be adequately structured via a purely contractual form of organization, firms incur unnecessary bureaucratic
and set up costs without the compensating benefits. That is, in the
latter case, the inefficiencies presented by equity joint venture
structure outweigh the gains from enhanced coordination. In either case, misaligned choice likely stifles the benefits from collaboration, exacerbating moral hazard problems or slowing and
politicizing decision-making such that responsiveness is dampened
or sub-optimal decisions are made with respect to alliance activities.
To test this general hypothesis, Sampson groups alliances according to contracting difficulties.62 According to transaction cost
logic, those alliances with greater contracting difficulties should
choose an equity joint venture for alliance structure. Conversely,
those alliances that have low contracting difficulties can be structured by purely contractual forms without the need for the added
costs of the equity joint venture. Using a common empirical technique to estimate outcomes of choices not made,63 Sampson then
compares alliance outcomes under the structure chosen with the
structure not chosen. 64 Empirical evidence from this estimation
shows that misaligned alliance structure - that is, structure not
chosen consistent with transaction cost logic - exacts a toll on collaborative outcomes. Estimates show that firms choosing misaligned structure could improve collaborative outcomes by an average of 138 percent by choosing aligned structure instead. Thus,
this result implies that structure does indeed matter for alliance
outcomes. Thoughtful consideration of how to organize inter-firm
collaboration may help avoid the many pitfalls in coordinating
across organizational boundaries.
V.

ROLE OF LAWYERS IN ALLIANCES

Since the theme of this symposium is the "role of lawyers in
strategic alliances," it seems appropriate to conclude by reflecting
62 Id. These difficulties were estimated to be a function of the alliance activities and
institutional environment. Fundamentally, though, contracting difficulties rise when alliance
activities are more complex or have more uncertain outcomes.
63 See James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153, 153-55 (1979) (detailing the analysis of sample selection bias).
64 Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances, supra note 36.
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on the role lawyers play in drafting alliance agreements and as
partners in planning inter-firm collaboration. The role of lawyers
in strategic alliances can be seen as analogous to the role of structure in strategic alliances - clearly important, but often overlooked. Despite the recent evidence on the importance of alliance
structure, structure is one of the most overlooked aspects of alliance formation. 65 This oversight is similar to that noted in recent
merger waves. As The Economist notes: "Too many mergers...
duck the hardest questions until after the deal has gone through...
. Companies that agree on a clear strategy and management structure before 66
they tie the knot stand a better chance of living happily

ever after.,

Unfortunately, managers often resist careful consideration of
formal structure initially, perhaps believing that structure is of
secondary importance or that the process of setting out formal
rights and obligations in a contract may erode trust between partners. 67 This resistance to formal planning may, in part, explain the
failure of many alliances to live up to partner expectations. Survey
based evidence shows that partner firms are not satisfied with the
results of their collaborative activities.68 Larger scale empirical
research suggests that the termination rates in joint ventures are
higher than can be explained by the successful attainment of joint
goals. Kogut argues: "The significant number of terminations of
joint ventures in the early years suggests, however, that many of
these terminations are a result of business failure or a fundamental
69
instability in governance.,
Given the propensity of business executives and dealmakers
to avoid the more difficult planning processes until the deal has
gone through, lawyers are an important counterbalance to the oversight and hubris that may accompany such deals. By forcing articulation of issues critical to alliance success, such as goals,
frameworks to deal with unexpected contingencies, and explicit
65

JOHN R. HARBISON & PETER PEKAR, JR., SMART ALLIANCES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO

REPEATABLE SUCCESS (1998).
66 How to Make Mergers Work, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at 15, 16.

67 Research in the behavioral management field has argued that legalistic enforcement of
relationships may reduce the level of trust, by imposing a, "psychological and/or an interactional
barrier between the two parties that stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and distance."
See Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic 'Remedies' for Trust/Distrust,ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 367, 369 (August 1993); see also Granovetter,
supra note 51, at 481 (discussing behavior and how institutions are affected by social relations);
Larson, supra note 54, at 76 (examining social control in network organizational forms).
68 JOEL BLEEKE & DAVID ERNST, COLLABORATING TO COMPETE:

ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1993).

USING STRATEGIC

69 Bruce Kogut, The Stability of Joint Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive
Rivalry, 38
J. INDUS. ECON. 183, 184 (1989).
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expectations of each partner, legal counsel can temper any such
hubris and faddishness and prevent firms from entering costly projects without consideration of the consequences.
Alliance structure has many dimensions, several of which are
discussed in detail above, and can involve considerable complexity, requiring the guidance of an expert practitioner. While much
of this structure is concerned with protecting a firm's interests
should the alliance activities go awry, structure is more than constraints on behavior. Structure, even if not of the legally enforceable type, helps to reduce misunderstandings and eases collaboration by providing mechanisms for communication and setting clear
expectations and plans in advance. In this sense, lawyers can be
(and are) more than simply legal technicians - acting as true business partners and advisors in helping to set this structure.
The importance of such structure in alliances cannot be underestimated. Poorly chosen structure quickly becomes apparent,
often leading to costly missteps and communication failures, reducing the confidence of firms in their partners and ultimately reducing the probability of success. In contrast, good structure is
often unobservable, facilitating value creation and effective collaboration. Appropriate and thoughtful structure, while perhaps
thought of as a secondary concern, ultimately is what allows firms
to focus on achieving the ultimate goals of the alliance.

